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1 
INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: AFFIRMING THE RIGHT TO HABITAT 




Abstract: In 1970, several tribes in the Pacific Northwest, along with their federal trustee, 
sued the state of Washington claiming that numerous state actions violated their treaty rights, 
which assured them “the right of taking fish in common with” white settlers. The tribes and 
their federal trustee maintained that the treaties of the 1850s guaranteed the tribes: (1) a share 
of fish harvests for subsistence, cultural, and commercial purposes; (2) inclusion of hatchery 
fish in that harvest share; and (3) protection of the habitat necessary for the salmon that were 
the basis of the treaty bargain and the peaceful white settlement of the Pacific Northwest. By 
1985, the tribes and the trustee persuaded the courts of the merits of the first two 
propositions, but the Ninth Circuit deferred on the third issue, declining to declare that the 
treaties supplied habitat protection in the absence of a specific factual dispute. 
Some two decades later, in 2007, the tribes and the federal government convinced United 
States District Court Judge Ricardo Martinez that the state’s construction and maintenance of 
road culverts blocking salmon access to their spawning grounds violated the 1850s treaties. 
In 2013, after settlement talks failed, the district court issued an injunction that required most 
of the offending barrier culverts to be remedied within seventeen years, or by 2030. Claiming 
exaggerated costs of compliance, the state appealed, and in 2016 a unanimous panel of the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s allegations wholesale. 
This Article examines the reasoning of both the district court and the Ninth Circuit and 
the path ahead, which may implicate road culverts owned by other governments and other 
habitat-damaging activities like dams, water diversions, and land management actions 
affecting water quality and quantity. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on foundational 
rules of treaty construction to interpret the scope of the treaty right of taking fish could 
influence other Indian treaty cases beyond the issue of off-reservation fishing rights.  Even if 
confined to treaties with off-reservation rights, the case represents the most significant 
interpretation of treaty fishing rights in nearly four decades. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One hundred sixty years ago, during treaty negotiations that led 
Indian tribes to cede some 64 million acres to the federal government 
and ensure the largely peaceful settlement of the Pacific Northwest, the 
principal federal negotiator, Governor Isaac Ingalls Stevens, stated, “I 
want that you shall not have simply food and drink now but that you 
may have them forever.”1 Later, he announced, “This paper is such as a 
man would give to his children and I will tell you why. This paper gives 
you a home. Does not a father give his children a home? . . . This paper 
secures your fish. Does not a father give food to his children?”2 The full 
meaning of those promises has been the subject of almost continuous 
litigation for over 130 years
3
 as courts have grappled with the treaty 
                                                     
1. See United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing negotiations during 
the Point Elliot Treaty). 
2. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 667 n.11 (1979) (citing 
negotiations during the Point-No-Point Treaty). 
3. The first reported case was Spedis v. Simpson (Klickitat Cty. Ct., July 22, 1884) (on file in 
Klickitat County, Wash. Archives, File KLK-126); see also Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, 
“Not Much Less Necessary . . . Than the Atmosphere They Breathed”: Salmon, Indian Treaties, and 
the Supreme Court—A Centennial Remembrance of United States v. Winans and Its Enduring 
Significance, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 489, 506 n.89 (2006) [hereinafter Winans Centennial] (citing 
 
04 - Blumm.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  2:40 PM 
2017] TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3 
 
language reserving to tribes “[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and 
accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with [the incoming 
white settlers].”4 
The latest round of litigation began in 2001, when the federal 
government and twenty-one tribes sued the State of Washington over its 
construction and maintenance of road culverts,
5
 which migrating fish 
like salmon use to pass highways and other roads. In 2007, United States 
District Court Judge Ricardo Martinez ruled that the state’s culverts 
violated the treaty right by “affirmatively diminish[ing] the number of 
fish available for harvest,” even though the tribes could not give exact 
figures on the number of fish lost.
6
 In reaching his decision, Judge 
Martinez relied on well-established rules of treaty interpretation favoring 
the tribes,
7
 mindful of the fact that the consideration for the immense 
amount of land the tribes ceded in the treaties was largely the “right of 
taking fish,” coupled with assurances from federal negotiators that the 
United States would protect that right.
8
 
The 2007 Martinez Decision prompted several years of negotiation 
between the tribes and the state over how fast the state would rehabilitate 
passage-blocking culverts (barrier culverts),
9
 but with no agreement. 
                                                     
BRAD ASHER, BEYOND THE RESERVATION: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE LAW IN WASHINGTON 
TERRITORY, 1853–1889, at 150–53 (1999)).  
4. For the full language, see infra note 20. 
5. The case grew out of litigation that began in 1970. See infra notes 12, 14, 62 and 
accompanying text. Road culverts—often a cheap substitute for bridges—are pipes or arches made 
of metal or concrete that allow water flow under roads or railroads crossing waterways, preventing 
flooding and erosion. Design or maintenance flaws can cause culverts to block fish migration. See 
Michael C. Blumm & Jane G. Steadman, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and Habitat Protection: The 
Martinez Decision Supplies a Resounding Judicial Reaffirmation, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653, 677–
78 (2009) [hereinafter Resounding Reaffirmation].  
6. United States v. Washington, No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 
22, 2007) [hereinafter Martinez Decision]. 
7. See infra notes 35–37, 45, 72, 117, 119–20, 128 and accompanying text. 
8. Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *7–8 (citing Washington v. Commercial Passenger 
Fishing Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 677 (1979)). The Supreme Court stated that the small amount of 
monetary compensation for the land cessions in the treaties would not amount to fair compensation 
if the treaties assured the tribes only the right to fish on an equal basis with white settlers:  
[I]t is accordingly inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers 
to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish. That each 
individual Indian would share an ‘equal opportunity’ with thousands of newly arrived 
individual settlers is totally foreign to the spirit of the negotiations. Such a ‘right,’ along with 
the $207,500 paid the Indians, would hardly have been sufficient to compensate them for the 
millions of acres they ceded to the Territory.  
Id.  See also infra notes 73, 81, 137 and accompanying text. 
9. The real issue was how quickly the state would repair its culverts, since it committed do so 
under state law, but its pace was extremely slow with no deadlines for finishing. See infra notes 
196–98 and accompanying text. 
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Consequently, the case went to trial in 2009 and 2010. In 2013, the judge 
issued an injunction establishing schedules for the state to fix the 
culverts.
10
 The state appealed, claiming that the judge’s injunction would 
cost the state some $2.4 billion.
11
 
In 2016—nine years after Judge Martinez’s initial decision and forty-
six years after the tribes filed suit seeking habitat protection
12—the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed. Judge William Fletcher, writing for a unanimous 
panel, relied heavily on foundational Indian law interpretative principles 
and upheld the lower court’s injunction in all respects.13 The result 
represented a thorough victory for the tribes and their federal trustee and 
a considerable setback for the state, which was unable even to win so 
much as a modification of Judge Martinez’s injunction. Assuming the 
decision is not overturned on appeal, the result vindicated the tribes’ 
efforts of nearly a half-century of litigation to obtain judicial recognition 
that their treaties entitled them to: (1) a share of fish harvests, especially 
salmon; (2) inclusion of hatchery fish in that harvest share; and (3) 
protection for the environment necessary to preserve the fish.
14
 All of 
these claims have now succeeded, albeit only after long and tortuous 
litigation. 
                                                     
10. United States v. Washington, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391 (W.D. Wash. March 29, 
2013) [hereinafter Martinez Injunction]. The court’s injunction gave the state until October 2016 to 
correct specified culverts, seventeen years to correct other priority culverts, and the remainder at the 
end of the natural life of the culvert or in connection with independent projects. See United States v. 
Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 848 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing the trial court’s injunction); infra notes 
103–13 and accompanying text. 
11. The state was quoted in the press as claiming the cost of the injunction would be $2.4 billion 
over fifteen years. Lynda V. Mapes, Federal Appeals Court Hears Fish-Blocking-Culvert Case, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/federal-
appeals-court-hears-fish-blocking-culvert-case/ [https://perma.cc/BA4K-U9KS]. The Ninth Circuit 
ultimately concluded that the costs would be far less. See infra notes 148–52 and accompanying 
text. 
12. On the fact that the claim filed in the so-called Boldt Decision included the three causes of 
action that the tribes and their federal trustee filed in 1970, see MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING 
THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 80–
82 (2002) [hereinafter SACRIFICING SALMON]. 
13. Washington, 827 F.3d at 850 (relying on foundational principles of treaty interpretation such 
as “[t]he language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice”) 
(quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832)); id. at 865 (affirming the district court’s 
decision to enjoin Washington to correct barrier culverts in accordance with the treaties).  See also 
infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
14. See id. at 845–46 (discussing the initial case, filed in 1970, and agreeing that the treaties 
entitled the tribes to a share of fish harvest); id. at 846 (discussing earlier proceedings affirming that 
hatchery fish must be included in determining the share of salmon for the tribes): id. at 853 
(agreeing with the district court that Washington has a duty to protect the environment in order to 
guarantee the tribes’ share of fish under the treaties). 
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This Article explains the Ninth Circuit’s culverts decision and its 
implications for the future. Part I sets the stage by briefly describing the 
context in which the nearly half-century old case began, including the 
State of Washington’s long and shameful efforts to preempt tribal 
fisheries and the Supreme Court’s many interpretations of the Stevens 
Treaty language. Part II turns to the litigation that led up to the Martinez 
Decision, the so-called Boldt Decision
15
 and its affirmance by the 
Supreme Court. Part III considers the case law following the Boldt 
Decision, which confirmed that hatchery fish were included in the tribal 
allocation but inconclusively resolved the habitat issue when the Ninth 
Circuit declared in 1985 that the question was too vague to decide in the 
abstract. 
Part IV then turns to the Martinez Decision in both its declaratory and 
injunctive relief phases. Part V examines the Ninth Circuit’s resounding 
affirmance of Judge Martinez’s decision, based in large measure on 
foundational canons of treaty interpretation. Part VI looks beyond the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, to assess its implications outside the State of 
Washington’s road culverts, including consideration of federal and local 
road culverts as well as other habitat-damaging activities like timber 
harvesting, dam operations, and land use practices. The Article 
concludes that the case reflects the federal trust relationship with Indian 
tribes at its best, as the tribes and the federal trustee worked together 
since 1970 to procure meaningful treaty fishing rights. Moreover, while 
eliminating barrier culverts will significantly improve the fish habitat in 
the Puget Sound basin, the decision’s implications beyond Washington 
and beyond state-owned road culverts portend significant future changes 
in land and water-use management in the Northwest. The culverts case 
could, for example, cause both the states and the federal government to 
consult with tribes concerning development projects potentially affecting 
treaty rights. Such consultation could avoid litigation over other habitat-
damaging proposals in the future. 
I. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON’S HISTORIC PREEMPTION 
OF TRIBAL FISHING AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
OF THE TREATY “RIGHT OF TAKING FISH” 
Soon after the treaties of the 1850s, the white settlers in the Pacific 
Northwest began to physically preempt tribal fishers by securing 
locational advantages on rivers, estuaries, and in Puget Sound and the 
                                                     
15. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) [hereinafter Boldt Decision]. 
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 This physical preemption was soon followed by legal measures 
that sanctioned this preemption.
17
 The federal courts, however, soon 
weighed in with path-breaking interpretations of the treaties as 
recognizing tribal property rights—interpretations ratified by the United 
States Supreme Court—that foreclosed complete preemption of tribal 
fisheries.
18
 This Part discusses these developments. 
A. The Salmon Fishery and State Preemption 
The negotiations that led to what are now known as the Stevens 
Treaties made clear that both the tribes and the federal representatives 
intended to protect and preserve the tribes’ ability to fish in order to 
sustain themselves and their way of life.
19
 All the treaties contained 
similar language, recognizing the tribal “right of taking fish, at all usual 
and accustomed grounds . . . in common with” white settlers.20 Although 
the treaties did not expressly mention salmonids, they were the central 
focus of the negotiations, as salmon were essential to tribal economic 
and cultural practices which the tribes bargained to retain.
21
 Salmon are 
easy to harvest, given their homing instinct; the Supreme Court even 
analogized salmon harvests to agricultural crops.
22
 Thus, achieving a 
locational advantage along the migratory route of salmon runs is critical 
when competition among harvesters becomes intense. 
                                                     
16. See Winans Centennial, supra note 3, at 507–09 (describing commercial fishing at the mouth 
of the Columbia River and the use of fish wheels preempting upriver tribal harvests). 
17. See id. at 509–10 (discussing state designations of “salmon preserves,” restrictions on net 
sizes, and seasonal closures that disadvantaged tribal fishing); infra note 24.  
18. On the property rights recognized by the Stevens’ Treaties, see Michael C. Blumm & Brett 
M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A 
Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 435–45 (1998) [hereinafter Piscary Profit]. 
19. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 56–63. Federal treaty negotiators saw the tribes’ 
continued commercial and subsistence fishing to be a means of tribal livelihoods that would avoid 
federal subsidies or rations.  See infra notes 21, 73, 81 and accompanying text.  
20. The fishing clause of the Stevens Treaty generally provided: 
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to 
said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for 
the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and 
pasturing their horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided, however, That they shall not 
take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens. 
United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 849 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis omitted). 
21. According to the Ninth Circuit, “salmon were a central concern” of the treaty negotiations. Id. 
at 851 (citing historian Richard White of Stanford). The government intended that tribal fishers 
would supply the settlers with food as a result of their salmon harvests, and thus become an integral 
part of the pioneer economy. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 5, 61–63. 
22. Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 663 (1979) (analogizing the 
salmon runs to agricultural crops due to the relative predictability of harvests). 
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During the late nineteenth century, non-tribal fishers secured 
locational advantages in the Columbia River and Puget Sound basins by 
shifting fishing efforts downriver and into the bays, estuaries, and ocean. 
They thus could harvest salmon before the salmon reached a tribe’s 
upriver usual and accustomed fishing grounds, thereby physically 
preempting treaty-recognized fisheries. These efforts were aided by 
technological innovations such as gasoline-powered ocean troll boats 
and refrigerated railroad cars that delivered fresh salmon to distant 
markets like San Francisco, New York, and even Japan.
23
 Moreover, the 
state intervened to aid non-tribal fisheries by outlawing net fishing 
where the only net fishing was by tribal members.
24
 
Washington courts were quite complicit in this effort to legally 
preempt tribal fisheries, as they repeatedly affirmed the state’s authority 
to regulate the fishery by disadvantaging tribal fishers.
25
 And they did so 
in overtly racist language. Consider the following statement from the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s 1916 decision of State v. 
Towessnute
26
 in which the court, after declaring a Stevens Treaty to be a 
“dubious document” and expressly rejecting the “premise of Indian 
sovereignty,” asserted that “the aborigines” had only the rights of “mere 
occupants.”27 This physical and legal preemption took place despite a 
considerable body of federal case law that began in the territorial courts 
and suggested that this preemption was illegal. 
B. The Early Cases 
The first recorded treaty fishing rights case occurred in 1884, when 
Frank Taylor purchased a homestead adjacent to Celilo Falls, and then 
leased the land to an Indian, William Spedis, who proceeded to deny 
                                                     
23. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
24. See id. at 64 (discussing so-called “salmon preserves” that displaced tribal fishers); 
Washington, 827 F.3d at 843 (citing a 1907 statute forbidding off-reservation tribal fishing except 
by hook-and-line and a 1934 initiative banning fixed gear to harvest salmonids, which outlawed 
tribal net fishing off-reservation). 
25. See, e.g., State v. Tulee, 7 Wash. 2d 124, 109 P.2d 280 (Wash. 1941), rev’d, 315 U.S. 681, 
685 (1942) (discussed infra note 50 and accompanying text); State v. Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 
154 P. 805 (1916); SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 74–77 (discussing these cases and other 
efforts of the state of Washington to legally preempt tribal fisheries). 
26. 89 Wash. 478, 154 P. 805 (1916).  
27. Towessnute, 89 Wash. at 480–81, 154 P. at 806–07 (quoted in Washington, 827 F.3d at 843). 
The Towessnute court also stated, “The Indian was a child, and a dangerous child, of nature, to be 
both protected and restrained. In his nomadic life he was to be left so long as civilization did not 
demand his region.” Id. at 482, 154 P. at 807. 
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Yakama tribal members access to their ancient Tumwater fishery.
28
 
Yakama fishers then forcibly removed Spedis to the Yakama 
Reservation; after his release, he successfully sued for damages, 
although he had trouble collecting.
29
 The Indian agent for the Yakama’s 
thought that Taylor’s lease reflected “white manipulation” of tribal 
fishers,
30
 a sentiment that appeared to be justified by the next case. 
Frank Taylor, instigator of the Spedis controversy, sold his 160-acre 
tract to O.D. Taylor (apparently unrelated), a Baptist minister, who 
evicted tribal fishermen in favor of whites to whom he leased fishing 
rights.
31
 Taylor proceeded to fence out the Indians, burned some of their 
temporary fishing structures, and dynamited the shore to create space for 
four large fish wheels.
32
 Yakama Indian agent Robert H. Milroy, along 
with several tribal members, sought an injunction against Taylor 
declaring a violation of treaty rights, which the federal district court 
refused to grant.
33
 But the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington 
reversed in a prescient decision that anticipated the next century of 
federal treaty rights decisions. 
Justice John P. Hoyt thought that the basic question in the case was 
the intention of the Indians in reserving the fishing right in the treaties.
34
 
Hoyt invoked what would become known as the canons of treaty 
construction,
35
 reasoning that the treaty language had to be “liberally 
                                                     
28. See Winans Centennial, supra note 3, at 512. 
29. See id. at 512 n.135 (“The $500 jury award remained uncollected until a forced sale of one of 
the defendant’s belongings three years later brought $156.76.”). 
30. See id. at 513. 
31. See id. at 516–17. 
32. See id. Fish wheels were water-powered devices used for catching salmon that were so 
effective in harvesting fish that they were banned on the Columbia River in the early twentieth 
century. They were revolving wheels with baskets and paddles attached to their rims that use the 
river current to turn the wheel and lift migrating salmon out of the river. When the wheel floated on 
the river, the river current turned the wheel, causing the baskets to scoop down upon the salmon 
traveling upstream and lift them out of the water. Fish wheels are still allowed in Alaska on the 
Copper and Yukon Rivers. See Kaushik, Catching Salmons with Fish Wheels, AMUSING PLANET 
(May 28, 2015), http://www.amusingplanet.com/2015/05/catching-salmons-with-fish-wheels.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UWR-XRXZ]. 
33. See Winans Centennial, supra note 3, at 517. 
34. United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 96, 13 P. 333, 335 (1887). 
35. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton  
et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN TREATISE]; MATHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 5.4 (2016). The canons are basically four in number: (1) treaties are construed as the Indians 
would understand; (2) treaties and treaty substitutes (like statutes and executive orders) are liberally 
construed in favor of the Indians; (3) ambiguities are resolved in favor of the Indians; and (4) tribal 
sovereignty and property rights are preserved unless Congress clearly and unambiguously provides 
otherwise. For a recent treatment of the canons, see Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their 
Prejudice: In Honor of David Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2013).  
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construed in favor of the Indians.”36 Articulating an early version of the 
reserved rights doctrine, Judge Hoyt stated that “the Indians, in making 
the treaty . . . more likely . . . grant[ed] only such rights as they were to 
part with, rather than . . . conveyed all . . . .”37 He thus concluded that the 
tribe possessed a servitude, a property right impressed upon Frank 
Taylor’s homestead title.38 Consequently, the Court enjoined Taylor and 
his successors from interfering with Indian “ancient” fishing practices 
that had been used “for generations” and recognized in the treaty 
language.
39
 The United States Supreme Court would invoke the 
principles used by Judge Hoyt over the next century. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decisions 
During the twentieth century, conflicts between tribal and white 
fishermen caused the United States Supreme Court to interpret the treaty 
“right of taking fish” seven times.40 The Court employed the canons of 
treaty interpretation
41
 and, almost invariably, broadly interpreted the 
nature of the rights the tribes reserved in the 1850s treaties. In United 
States v. Winans,
42
 which involved access to the same Celilo Falls 
fishery at issue in the Taylor dispute, the Court reversed a lower court 
decision that dissolved a temporary injunction prohibiting the Winans 
Brothers Packing Company from excluding tribal fishers.
43
 In 
memorable words, Justice Joseph McKenna’s opinion for the Court 
described the treaty negotiations in almost poetic language
44
 and 
emphatically endorsed the canons of treaty interpretation: 
                                                     
36. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. at 96, 13 P. at 334–35. 
37. Id. at 335. 
38. Id. at 336. The court rejected Taylor’s argument that his land patent issued under the federal 
Homestead Act abrogated the treaty fishing right, stating that the statute “only authorize[d] the 
extinguishment of the title which the government holds at the time of the appropriation; and, if the 
land selected by the settler has a such time any servitude or easement impressed upon it, he takes 
subject thereto.” Id. 
39. Id. at 335–36. 
40. See infra notes 42–54, 71–76 and accompanying text. 
41. See COHEN TREATISE, supra note 35, at § 2.02[1]; FLETCHER, supra note 35, at § 5.4. 
42. 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
43. For a detailed account of the conflict, see Winans Centennial, supra note 3, at 523–36. See 
also id. at 536–44 (explaining the significance of the Winans decision as (1) ratifying the rule that 
treaties would be construed as the tribes would understand; (2) establishing the reserved rights 
doctrine; (3) considering treaty rights to establish property rights; and (4) rejecting the state’s “equal 
footing” argument). 
44. “The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was part of larger rights possessed by 
the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not 
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[W]e have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as ‘that 
unlettered people’ understood it, and ‘as justice and reason 
demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over 
those to whom they owe care and protection,’ and counterpoise 
the inequality ‘by the superior justice which looks only to the 
substance of the right, without regard to technical rules.’45 
Like the Taylor court, the Supreme Court interpreted the treaty 
fishing right to impress an easement on private lands, enabling tribal 
fisherman to access their reserved fishing grounds.
46
 But while reading 
the treaty language to provide tribal fishers a property right to access 
historic fishing grounds, the Court also announced that the state was not 
restrained, “if at all,” from regulating the fishery.47 This dictum 
emboldened the state to use its police power during the first three-




Soon after its historic 1905 decision, the Court expanded the nature of 
the tribal reserved right to extend to lands not expressly ceded by the 
treaties, ruling that Yakama fishers’ treaty rights extended to the Oregon 
side of the Columbia River.
49
 Later, in 1942, the Court declared that the 
treaties protected tribal members fishing at historic sites from state 
licensing fees.
50
 Thus, the Court added fiscal preemption to the 
proscribed physical preemption of its earlier decisions. 
In a series of decisions concerning the state’s regulation of salmon 
fishing on the Puyallup River, the Court first decided that the treaties 
allowed the state to regulate tribal fishing in the interest of conservation 
of the fish, so long as the regulation was non-discriminatory and met 
                                                     
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”  Winans, 
198 U.S. at 381. 
45. Id. at 380–81 (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 30 (1886); Jones v. 
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 44 (1899)). 
46. Id. at 381–82 (referring to the treaty fishing right as impressing “a servitude upon every piece 
of land as though described therein . . . intended to be continuing against the United States and its 
grantees as well as against the state and its grantees”).  
47. Id. at 384 (“Nor does it restrain the state unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right. 
It only fixes in the land such easements as enable the right to be exercised.”). 
48. See, e.g., supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text; United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 
836, 842–45 (9th Cir. 2016) (retracing the history of government disadvantaging tribal fishers). 
49. Seufort Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 197–98 (1919). 
50. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942). An unintended consequence of this decision 
was to make states not invested in tribal fisheries because they could not charge tribal members 
license fees.  Since only non-tribal fishers funded the budgets of state fishery agencies, state fishery 
managers consequently did not think of the tribes as their constituents.  
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“appropriate standards.”51 But when the state decided to employ this 
“conservation necessity” authority to ban all net fishing on the river, the 
Court quickly was forced to clarify that such a ban—which affected only 
tribal fishers—was proscribed because it was discriminatory in effect, 
even though it was not facially discriminatory.
52
 The state’s definition of 
conservation was overbroad, as it sought to “conserve” salmon for non-
tribal fishers.
53
 Perhaps recognizing the state’s persistent regulatory bias, 
the Court called for “fairly apportioned” harvests between tribal and 
non-tribal fishers.
54
 Lower courts were already grappling with devising 
such an allocation to safeguard the treaty fishing right. 
II. THE BOLDT DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
In the 1960s, Oregon and Washington routinely arrested tribal 
members for fishing in violation of state conservation regulations.
55
 In 
one such case, Judge Robert Belloni of the United States District Court 
for the District of Oregon rejected the State of Oregon’s argument that 
the treaties gave the tribes only an equal opportunity to fish with others, 
                                                     
51. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398, 401–03 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup I] 
(without identifying which standards were “appropriate”). 
52. Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1973) [hereinafter Puyallup II]. Justice 
William Douglas wrote Puyallup I and II. David Getches considered Douglas foremost an 
environmentalist when treaty rights and the environment (in this case “the last living steelhead”) 
clashed. David H. Getches, Conquering the Culture Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme 
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1632 n.284 (1996).  
53. Professor Johnson presciently warned of the trouble that the Court’s loose interpretation of 
conservation would cause in a critique of the Puyallup I decision. Ralph W. Johnson, The States 
Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 
207, 208–09 (1972). 
54. Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48–49. The Supreme Court was unable to extricate itself from the 
Puyallup controversy without issuing a third opinion, after the Ninth Circuit ruled that the tribal 
fishing at issue was actually on-reservation, not—as the Supreme Court had assumed—off-
reservation, because the appeals court ruled that the Puyallup reservation had not been extinguished. 
Fearing that an exclusive on-reservation right would allow tribal fishermen to “interdict completely 
the migrating fish run and ‘pursue the last living [Puyallup River] steelhead,’” the Court affirmed a 
state court’s allocation of forty-five percent of steelhead harvests to the tribe. Dep’t of Game v. 
Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. 165, 176–77 (1977) [hereinafter Puyallup III].  
55. For example, David Sohappy was arrested for fishing with a net in violation of state 
regulations. Like Sampson Tulee before him, Sohappy was jailed, and the case was a criminal 
offense. One tribal leader, Billy Frank, Jr., later awarded the Martin Luther King, Jr. Distinguished 
Service Award for Humanitarian Achievement, was arrested over fifty times. See THE LIFE AND 
LEGACY OF BILLY FRANK, JR., http://billyfrankjr.org/ [https://perma.cc/7YYF-UNUA]; see 
generally CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON, 
TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 4 (2000) (explaining that Billy Frank, Jr. was arrested more than 
fifty times by state law enforcement officials in the 1950s and 1960s for fishing in violation of state 
regulations). 
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subject to state regulation.
56
 This regulation limited fishing on the 
Columbia River above Bonneville Dam to hook-and-line fishing, 
effectively eliminating traditional tribal net fishing.
57
 Striking down the 
state regulation in memorable words,
58
 Belloni ruled that the tribes were 
entitled to a “fair share” of the harvests,59 although he did not define 
what precisely those terms meant.
60
 In a similar case, involving Puget 
Sound fisheries, Judge George Boldt would soon do so. 
Following the Belloni Decision, tribal members continued to be 
arrested for off-reservation fishing, especially in Puget Sound.
61
 The 
tribes and the federal government filed suit in 1970, claiming that the 
treaty fishing promise assured them: (1) a fair allocation of harvests; (2) 
inclusion of hatchery fish in that allocation; and (3) protection of the 
environment and habitat necessary to provide meaningful subsistence 
and commercial harvests.
62
 Judge Boldt heard evidence for some three 
years on the first issue, while deferring consideration of the latter two 
issues. 
Invoking the canons of treaty interpretation, Boldt decided that the 
state’s regulatory scheme systematically discriminated against the tribal 
fishing right by closing historic fishing sites to net fishing to the extent 
that at the time of trial the tribes were harvesting only about two percent 
                                                     
56. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 910–11 (D. Or. 1969). 
57. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 79. 
58. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 905 (responding to the state’s equal opportunity argument, the court 
stated, “Such a reading would not seem unreasonable if all history, anthropology, biology, prior 
case law and the intention of the parties to the treaties were to be ignored.”). 
59. Id. at 911. 
60. Judge Belloni did order the state to adopt an objective of treating the tribal fishery “co-equal 
with the conservation of fish runs for other users.” Id. He later established detailed standards and 
procedures for the state to follow in producing this co-equal status, including: (1) enabling the tribes 
to “participate meaningfully” in the development of harvest regulations, and (2) requiring such 
regulations to be “the least restrictive which can be imposed [on the tribes] consistent with assuring 
the necessary escapement of fish for conservation.” Id. at 907, 912; Sohappy v. Oregon, No. 68-409, 
68-513 slip op. at 5, 8 (D. Or. July 8, 1969). See also Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: 
The History of Salmon in the Columbia Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 680–81 n.12 (1997) 
(reprinting a portion of Judge Belloni’s unreported decision).  Belloni gave a video interview 
concerning the case to the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission: Empty Promises, Empty 
Nets: Chinook Trilogy, vol. 2, YOUTUBE (Feb. 19, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URkgvvNNQVQ.   
61. See ROBERTA ULRICH, EMPTY NETS: INDIANS, DAMS, AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER 133 
(1999). A fish-in during the summer of 1970, staged to protest the arrests, led to a raid by federal 
agents only weeks before the filing of the suit that later became known as the Boldt Decision. See 
WILKINSON, supra note 55, at 5 (illustrating the fish-in that led to sixty-two people being arrested). 
62. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 443 
U.S. 658 (1979). 
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 Consequently, echoing Judge Belloni, Judge Boldt 
determined that the treaty “right of taking fish” required a fair allocation 
of harvests; however, he proceeded to define the treaty language “in 
common with” to mean a property right to half of the harvests.64 He 




Although Judge Boldt’s decision was a judicial landmark, 
implementing the court’s decree became problematic, as the decision 
generated widespread public outrage and state resistance.
66
 This 
recalcitrance prompted the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the decision, to 
remark that “[e]xcept for some desegregation cases, the district court has 
faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree 
of a federal court witnessed in this century.”67 The state exacerbated the 
situation by claiming that it lacked authority to implement the 
injunction, and the Washington State Supreme Court agreed.
68
 The 
upshot was that Judge Boldt had to issue numerous orders managing the 
fish harvests for several years.
69
 Perhaps influenced by the state’s 
intransigence in implementing a federal court decree that had been twice 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
70
 the United States Supreme Court agreed 
to interpret the meaning of the “right of taking” once again, for the 
fourth time in eleven years. 
                                                     
63. Id. at 393 (noting that the state had closed many historic tribal fishing sites to net fishing 
while “permitting commercial [non-Indian] net fishing for salmon elsewhere on the same runs of 
fish”). See also Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676–77 n.22 
(1979) (two percent of harvests). 
64. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 343 (construing “in common with” to mean “[b]y dictionary 
definition and as intended and used in the . . . treaties[,] . . . sharing equally the opportunity to take 
fish”). 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 55, at 58 (noting that Judge Boldt was hung in effigy by 
those protesting his decision). 
67. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(citations omitted).  
68. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 571 
P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1977) (en banc), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. 
Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (Wash. 1977) (en banc), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) 
(state court found that under state statutes and the state constitution the state lacked authority to 
recognize “special rights” for tribal fishers). 
69. In fact, Judge Boldt’s orders managing the salmon fishery during 1977–79 were so numerous 
that it took West Publishing Company two volumes to collect them. UNITED STATES V. STATE OF 
WASHINGTON, U.S. DIST. COURT, WESTERN DIST. OF WASHINGTON, 1974–1985 (VOL. I) & 1985–
2013 (VOL. 2) (Thomson Reuters 2015). 
70. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding Judge Boldt’s 
management of the fisheries); Unites States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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In 1979, the Court largely affirmed Judge Boldt in a 6-3 decision.
71
 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, applied the canons of treaty 
interpretation
72
 and construed the treaty fishing right language to 
preserve for the tribes a supply of fish—not merely an opportunity to 
fish. He cited Governor Stevens’ specific promise that the salmon would 
provide a continuous “source of food and commerce.”73 According to the 
Court, the treaties prevented the state from “crowd[ing] the Indians out” 
of the tribal fishery and guaranteed the tribes a fishing livelihood, up to 
fifty percent of the harvests.
74
 The Court’s affirmation of Judge Boldt on 
the harvest share issue
75
 did not, however, resolve the other two issues 
before the district court: (1) whether hatchery fish were included within 
the tribes’ allocated share; and (2) whether the treaties protected the fish 
against habitat-damaging activities. Those issues would occupy the 
attention of Judge Boldt’s successors.76 
                                                     
71. Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 696–97 (1979). Justice 
Powell wrote a dissent in which Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 696 (claiming that the 
treaty language should not be interpreted to guarantee a specific harvest share). 
72. Id. at 676 (“[T]he treaty must therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning 
of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the 
Indians.”) (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)). 
73. Id. 
74. See id. at 676, 686 (“[T]he central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural 
resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but 
not more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood—that is, to say, a moderate 
living.”); id. at 687 n.27 (“The logic of the 50% ceiling is manifest. For an equal division—
especially between parties who presumptively treated with each other as equals—is suggested, if not 
necessarily dictated, by the word ‘common’ as it appears in the treaties. Since the days of Solomon, 
such a division has been accepted as a fair apportionment of a common asset . . . .”). The Court 
opined that the “moderate living” standard would allow a judicial reduction below 50% if a tribe: 
(1) dwindled to just a few members; or (2) abandoned its fisheries. Id. at 687. No evidence of either 
condition has appeared since the Court’s 1979 opinion. On the significance of the insertion of the 
moderate living language by Justice Stevens, see Resounding Reaffirmation, supra note 5, at 672 
n.100 (explaining that Justice Marshall’s papers suggested that Justice Stevens thought the language 
was necessary to preserve the six-member majority). 
75. The Supreme Court made two modifications to Judge Boldt’s decision: (1) including on-
reservation harvests as well as off-reservations harvests in the tribal share; and (2) excluding 
harvests outside the state of Washington (in Alaskan and Canadian waters) in the non-tribal share. 
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 687–89. The latter exclusion would require an international agreement 
reducing salmon interceptions in the North Pacific. The Treaty Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, March 18, 
1985, T.I.A.S No. 11,091. See also SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 161–72. 
76. Judge Boldt, who was appointed to the federal bench by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 
1953, had retired from the case by the time of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 1979. He suffered 
from Alzheimer’s disease in his later years and died in 1984 at the age of 80. See Wolfgang Saxon, 
Judge George H. Boldt Dies: Ruling Set Off Fishing Battle, N.Y. TIMES (March 21, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/21/obituaries/judge-george-h-boldt-dies-ruling-set-off-fishing-
battle.html [https://perma.cc/LJA6-8A5D]. 
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III. BEYOND THE BOLDT DECISION: THE HATCHERY AND 
HABITAT ISSUES 
The courts resolved the hatchery fish issue rather quickly. The district 
judge who succeeded Judge Boldt, Judge William Orrick,
77
 ruled that the 
hatchery fish were included within the tribes’ allocation because the 
tribes reserved not merely a share of treaty-time harvests but also a share 
of future fish runs. Judge Orrick also stated that hatchery fish had 
become the overwhelming mitigation choice for spawning fish damaged 
by development activities like dam construction and operation.
78
 A panel 
of the Ninth Circuit agreed,
79
 as did an en banc panel.
80
 
But the habitat question proved more vexing. Judge Orrick ruled that 
the treaties protected fish habitat because the “[t]he most fundamental 
prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to 
be taken.”81 He reasoned that if the state could degrade fish habitat 
without limitation, the tribes’ ability to pursue the Supreme Court-
sanctioned “moderate living” would be jeopardized, threatening the 
                                                     
77. Judge William Orrick of the Northern District of California was appointed by the Ninth 
Circuit as Judge Boldt’s successor, as apparently no member of the Western District of Washington 
wanted to succeed Judge Boldt in such a controversial case. Judge Orrick was appointed to the 
federal bench by President Nixon in 1974, presided over San Francisco’s long-running school 
desegregation case and a civil rights suit challenging jail conditions, and he sentenced Patti Hearst 
to seven years for a bank robbery. He died in 2003 at the age of 87. See Reynolds Holding, William 
Orrick—U.S. District Judge (obituary), S.F. GATE (Aug. 16, 2003), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/William-Orrick-U-S-district-judge-2595886.php 
[https://perma.cc/3BC2-DYXL]. 
78. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 198–99 (W.D. Wash. 1980) [hereinafter 
Orrick Decision]. Judge Orrick also observed that hatchery fish were difficult to distinguish from 
spawning fish until harvested; hatchery fish were planted not merely by the state but also by the 
federal government; and under wild animals law the state had no claim to ownership of the fish once 
released to the wild. Id. at 196, 201 (“the Supreme Court has flatly rejected the notion that a state 
owns fish swimming within its waters”); id. at 202 (“[a]lthough the State provides considerable 
funding for its hatchery program, it is undisputed that federal and local governments as well as 
private parties also contribute to the construction and operation of State-run hatcheries.”). A three-
judge concurrence in Puyallup II had encouraged the state to argue that the “Treaty does not 
obligate the State of Washington to subsidize the Indian fishery with planted fish paid for by sports 
fishermen.” Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49–50 (1973) (Puyallup II) (White, J., 
concurring).  
79. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1379–85 (9th Cir. 1982). 
80. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
81. Orrick Decision, 506 F. Supp. at 203. Judge Orrick noted that the Supreme Court in affirming 
Judge Boldt found that the primary purpose of the treaty fishing right was to preserve the tribes’ 
economic and cultural way of life, and that federal negotiators “specifically assured the tribes that 
they could continue to fish notwithstanding the changes that the impending western expansion 
would certainly entail.” Id. at 204. 
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tribes with empty-net fishing, which the Court had also proscribed.
82
 
Therefore, Orrick established what appeared to be a rigorous formula for 
determining whether an activity violated the treaty right.
83
 The state 
appealed, and a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed but suggested that 
all the treaties required from the state were “reasonable steps” in light of 
its resources to preserve and enhance the fishery.
84
 
The tribes and the federal government sought and obtained en banc 
review, and a divided Ninth Circuit
85
 decided that it was judicially 
imprudent to determine the habitat issue via a declaratory judgment 
without concrete facts. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower 
court’s decision on this issue,86 although it largely affirmed on the 
                                                     
82. Id. at 208 (citing Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979)) 
(specifying that the tribes’ fifty percent share was a ceiling, not a floor, and that the treaties 
guaranteed the tribes “so much as but no more than is necessary to provide the Indians with a 
livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.”).  See supra note 74 on the moderate living language. 
83. Judge Orrick’s formula presumed that until the tribes’ share of the harvests was reduced to 
less than fifty percent, their “moderate living” needs were unmet. Until they were met, the state bore 
the burden of showing that  
any environmental degradation of the fish habitat proximately caused by the State’s actions 
(including the authorization of third parties’ activities) will not impair the tribes’ ability to 
satisfy their moderate living needs. Naturally, the plaintiffs must shoulder the initial burden of 
proving that the challenged action(s) will proximately cause the fish habitat to be degraded 
such that the rearing or production potential of the fish will be impaired or the size or quality of 
the run will be diminished.  
Id. at 208. 
84. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1347, 1381 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter 1982 
Washington], rejected Judge Orrick’s formula, supra note 83, fearing it would amount to an 
“environmental servitude with open-ended and unforeseeable consequences.” Id. The panel 
decision, written by Judge Joseph Sneed, also decided, without explanation, that the treaty 
obligations did not burden private parties. Id. at 1381 n.15. This result was completely inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s Winans decision. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Judge 
Stephen Reinhart wrote separately to suggest that there was little practical difference between the 
Orrick formula and the new “reasonableness” test, emphasizing that the treaty right did in fact 
protect the salmon supply against severe habitat degradation. Id. at 1390 (Reinhart, J., concurring).  
85. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) [hereinafter 1985 
Washington]. The case engendered six different opinions, including four different concurrences 
(two of which included partial dissents), and a dissent. For a discussion of the various opinions in 
the case, see Resounding Reaffirmation, supra note 5, at 675–76 & n.129. 
86. The court’s per curiam decision suggested that Judge Orrick should not have ruled on the 
habitat issue without concrete facts as a matter of judicial prudence, stating, “The legal standards 
that will govern the State’s precise obligations and duties under the treaty with respect to the myriad 
State actions that may affect the environment of the treaty area will depend for their definition and 
articulation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case.” 1985 Washington, 
759 F.2d at 1357. But the en banc court also vacated the three-judge panel “reasonableness” test for 
judging state compliance with the treaty right, although a concurrence would have affirmed the 
panel decision. Id. at 1360 (Sneed, J. and Anderson, J., concurring). 
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 Thus, in 1985, the tribes stood in roughly the same 
position on the habitat issue as they did when they filed the case fifteen 
years before: with no clear indication whether the treaties protected the 
fish that were the essential bargain for the largely peaceful white 
settlement that followed their signing in the 1850s. 
IV. THE CULVERTS CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The tribes spent much of the ensuing decade-and-a-half pursuing 
other means of fish restoration, particularly efforts to rebuild salmon 
runs, such as through the Northwest Power and the Endangered Species 
Acts.
88
 Some lower-court case law involving particular dams, pipelines, 
marinas, fish farms, and water rights suggested that the treaty right could 
restrain habitat-destructive actions, particularly those that blocked access 
to historic fishing sites.
89
 But by the turn of the century, there was no 
definitive ruling on whether the treaties protected fish from 
environmental degradation of their habitat. 
Between 1985 and 2001, the tribes searched for factual settings that 
would satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s demand for concrete evidence on the 
habitat issue. They eventually arrived at road culverts constructed and 
maintained by the state, which was an auspicious choice because the 
effect of poorly constructed or operated culverts is often quite dramatic: 
salmon migrating and spawning below the barrier culverts, but not at all 
above.
90
 As a result, the tribes and the federal government filed a new 
                                                     
87. Id. at 1357–60 (finding the hatchery issue to be sufficiently particularized to be subject to 
judicial resolution, but determining that Judge Orrick improperly concluded that the tribal harvest 
share was a minimum share when in fact it was a maximum). 
88. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 129–60, 173–217. 
89. For example, in 1981, Judge Belloni ordered a trial on the effects on treaty fishing rights of 
the proposed Northern Tier Pipeline that would have crossed Puget Sound to serve an oil terminal at 
Port Angeles, but the pipeline was soon abandoned. No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 372–73 
(W.D. Wash. 1981). In 1988, the Muckleshoot and Suquamish Tribes obtained a preliminary 
injunction temporarily stopping construction of a residential development in Elliot Bay that would 
have blocked tribal access to an historic fishing site without congressional approval, reinforcing an 
access component to the treaty fishing right. Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1505–06, 
1518–22 (W.D. Wash. 1988). And in 1996, the district court upheld the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers denial of a federal permit for a proposed “net pen” for a fish farm in Rosaria Straight 
because of adverse effects on the Lummi Tribe’s fishing rights, which the court ruled that the Corps 
had no right to diminish, because “only Congress has such power.” Nw. Sea Farms v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1519–23 (W.D. Wash. 1996). For discussion of these and 
similar cases, see Robert T. Anderson, Federal Treaty and Trust Obligations, and Ocean 
Acidification, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 474, 488–90 (2016); SACRIFICING SALMON, supra 
note 12, at 256–71; Piscary Profit, supra note 18, at 462–89. 
90. A recent academic paper claimed that it would be “difficult to overstate the threat which 
culverts pose to salmonid species throughout the Pacific Northwest,” pointing out that there are 
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subproceeding in the original United States v. Washington case in 2001; 
Judge Ricardo Martinez was assigned the case.
91
 
A. The 2007 Decision 
Six years later, after extensive briefing,
92
 Judge Martinez handed 
down a decision granting the tribes’ request for declaratory relief but 
deferring a determination on injunctive relief.
93
 The Martinez Decision 
emphasized that the treaty fishing right was an essential part of the 
bargain that led to one of the largest peaceful real estate transactions in 
                                                     
more than 10,000 culverts on fish-bearing streams on federal lands in Washington and Oregon 
alone. Christine Miller, If You Teach a Man to Fish: Barrier Culvert Removal in Washington State 
14 (Apr. 29, 2016) (unpublished paper written for University of Idaho Law Professor Barbara 
Cosens’ seminar on Law, Science and the Environment, on file with the author) (citing David Price, 
Timothy Quinn & Robert J. Barnard, Fish Passage Effectiveness of Recently Constructed Road 
Crossing Culverts in the Puget Sound Region of Washington State, 30:1 N. AM. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 
1100, 1100). Of the 3,000 culverts managed by the Washington State Department of Transportation, 
sixty percent are barriers to fish. According to one commentator: 
The problem of fish barrier culverts is more widespread than simply limiting the ability of 
adult salmon to return to spawning grounds. Movement is essential for thesuccessful life-cycle 
completion and persistence of populations of all animal species.Movement can be broken down 
into four categories: station keeping, ranging, migration,and accidental displacement, all of 
which Western salmonids express. Station keepingoccurs within an animal’s home range and 
includes foraging, commuting and territorial behavior. Ranging occurs when animals leave 
their home range for a short time in orderto explore new habitat. Migrations occur when 
animals make regular, predictable longdistance movement. Accidental displacments are caused 
by unpredictable environmentaland human-caused events such as fire, flood, hurricane or 
habitat alteration and destructionby humans. The ability to move is crucial to every part of the 
salmonid cycle. 
Salmonids require a multitude of habitats for their life-cycles. They utlize different habitats for 
spawning, rearing and refuge, and each of these habitats must be connected. The problem is 
complicated by the fact that different salmonid specieshave different movement patterns and 
habitat requirements. However, regardlessof the type of salmonide population, they must be 
able to move in order for populations to persist. Salmonids require spawning habitats which 
have cool,clear water and stable gravel beds. Juvenial salmonids require a diverse and 
connected habitat which utlilizes practically every segment with the stream environment. 
Salmonids require a diverse connected habitat which culvertscan adversely affect in a variety 
of ways. 
Id. at 15–16 (citing R. Hoffman & J. Dunman, Fish-Movement Ecology in High-Gradient Streams: 
Its Relevance to Fish-Passage Restoration Through Steam Culvert Barriers U.S. Geological Survey 
Rep. 2007-1140 (2007)) (pointing out that loss of mobility due to culverts can create genetic bottle-
necks, loss of genetic diversity and a reduction in population sizes, and that “[e]ven after culvert 
removal the effects of genetic bottlenecking in affected populations will persist for generations.” 
Miller, supra, at 17). 
91. Judge Martinez was appointed to the federal bench by President George W. Bush in 2003 and 
confirmed in 2004. He became chief judge of the Western District of Washington in 2016. 
92. See, e.g., Resounding Reaffirmation, supra note 5, at 683–87 (discussing some of the briefs). 
93. Martinez Decision, No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007). 
04 - Blumm.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  2:40 PM 




concluding that the treaties required the state to refrain from 
building or operating road culverts that hinder fish passage.
95
 
Judge Martinez first determined that road culverts were responsible 
for “some portion of the diminishment” of the tribes’ harvestable fish, 
even if the tribes could not provide an exact figure of the amount of fish 
taken by culverts.
96
 Second, he denied that recognizing such a right 
imposed a broad environmental servitude or imposed an affirmative duty 
on the state to take all possible measures to protect tribal fisheries.
97
 
Third, he rejected the state’s argument that the Supreme Court’s 
“moderate living” standard was unenforceable and instead ruled the 
standard could be applied to barrier culverts with the aid of the treaty 
rules of construction.
98
 For all of these reasons, Judge Martinez ruled 
that the treaties’ reservation of the tribes’ “right of taking fish” was more 
than merely an opportunity to fish.
99
 
Quoting extensively from the Supreme Court’s affirmance of Judge 
Boldt’s decision,100 the court decided that the assurances by the United 
States’ treaty negotiators that the tribes could continue their historical 
fishing practices “would only be meaningful if they carried the implied 
promise that neither the negotiators nor their successors would take 
actions that would significantly degrade the resource.”101 Thus, he 
determined that the treaty “right of taking fish” included a right of 
habitat protection which the state had violated through its construction 
and operation of road culverts blocking fish passage.
102
 
                                                     
94. Id. at *10. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at *3. A 1997 state study estimated that barrier culverts under control of the Washington 
Department of Transportation blocked some 249 linear miles of stream consisting of over 1.6 
million miles of salmon habitat sufficient to produce some 200,000 salmon per year. See United 
States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 857 (9th Cir. 2016). But the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
evidence before Judge Martinez indicated that “the total habitat blocked by state-owned barrier 
culverts in the Case Area is capable of producing several times the 200,000 mature salmon specified 
in the 1997 report.” Id. at 859 (finding that barrier culverts blocked almost 1,000 linear miles of 
streams, amounting to almost 5 million square miles of salmon habitat). 
97. Martinez Decision, No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 at *5 (“A narrowly-crafted 
declaratory judgment such as the one requested here does not raise the specter of a broad 
‘environmental servitude’ so feared by the State.”). 
98. Id. at *5–6 (concluding that “‘[m]oderate living’ . . . is neither a ‘missing term’ in the 
contract, nor a meaningless provision; it is a measure created by the Court. To the extent that it 
needs definition, it would be for the Court, not the Tribes, to define it.”).  
99. Id. at *7–8. 
100. Id. at *5–7. 
101. Id. at *10. 
102. Id. 
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B. The 2013 Injunction 
After a bench trial, and fruitless negotiations attempting to settle the 
case, Judge Martinez issued a decision on injunctive relief in 2013.
103
 
The court directed the state to identify, in consultation with the tribes 
and the federal government, all barrier culverts under state-owned roads 
using a prescribed methodology.
104
 The court then ordered the state by 
October 2016 to fix 180 barrier culverts within the case area owned or 
managed by the state fish and wildlife, natural resources, and parks 
agencies,
105
 which the state claimed it had planned to do anyway. For the 
more than 800 barrier culverts under the jurisdiction of the state 
transportation agency that blocked at least 200 meters of linear habitat, 
Judge Martinez gave the state seventeen years—or until 2030—to fix 
them.
106
 But he also provided an exemption for up to ten percent of the 
transportation agency’s culverts under certain conditions that included 
consultation with the tribes and the federal government and a physical 
survey of the habitat blocked by each culvert.
107
 The state must also fix 
all remaining barrier culverts at the end of the culvert’s usual life or in 
connection with a new highway project, whichever comes first.
108
 
The injunction also authorized the state to deviate from prescribed 
passage standards “in rare circumstances” on emergency grounds and 
under extraordinary conditions,
109
 and established monitoring conditions 
to ensure that fixed barrier culverts continue to supply requisite fish 
passage.
110
 The state must provide notice to the tribes of any changes in 
its culverts inventory, including the identification of previously 
unidentified barrier culverts, so the tribes can monitor state 
implementation of the injunction.
111
 Finally, and importantly, the court 
retained continuing jurisdiction “for a sufficient period” to oversee state 
                                                     
103. Martinez Injunction, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391 (W.D. Wash. March 29, 2013). 
104. Id. at *2 n.2 (citing the Fish Passage Barrier and Surface Water Diversion Screening 
Assessment and Prioritization Manual); see also United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 848 
(9th Cir. 2016) (discussing the trial court’s injunction). 
105. Martinez Injunction, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391 at *3 n.5. All new culverts had to 
meet prescribed fish passage standards. Id. at *3 n.4 (new culverts), *4 n.9 (existing culverts). 
106. Id. at *3 n.6; see United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d at 856–57. 
107. Martinez Injunction, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391 at *3–4 n.8; see United States v. 
Washington, 827 F.3d at 857. 
108. Martinez Injunction, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391*3 n.7. 
109. Id. at *4–5 n.10. 
110. Id. at *5 n.12. 
111. Id. at *5 n.13. 
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 The state appealed, claiming that the treaties provided no 
habitat protection injunction and maintaining that the Martinez 




V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S AFFIRMATION OF THE MARTINEZ 
DECISION 
In 2016, nine years after Judge Martinez declared that the state’s road 
culverts violated the treaty fishing right, and three years after he issued 




A. Affirming the Treaty Right to Habitat Protection 
At the outset, Judge William Fletcher, who had incredulously 
questioned the state’s suggestion at oral argument that it could destroy 
all the salmon runs,
115
 dismissed the state’s argument that the Stevens 
Treaties promised the tribes only half of the available harvest, not that 
“any fish will, in fact, be available.”116 The court specifically rejected 
the state’s contention that the main purpose of the treaties was to open 
the region to white settlement, explaining that the state failed to interpret 
the treaties as the tribes would understand, and the Indian understanding 
was that treaties would provide a means of supporting themselves 
through continued salmon harvests.
117
 Salmon were—in the words of the 
1905 Supreme Court—“not much less necessary to the existence of the 
[tribes] than the atmosphere they breathed.”118 Judge Fletcher 
emphasized that the tribes did not understand the treaties to allow the 
government “to diminish or destroy the fish runs”; interpreting the 
                                                     
112. Id. at *5 n.14. 
113. See Mapes, supra note 11.  
114. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016); see also infra note 156 and 
accompanying text. 
115. Washington, 827 F.3d at 850 (quoting from the state’s concession at oral argument that the 
treaties would not prohibit the state from damming every salmon stream in the Puget Sound basin). 
116. Id. at 849.  
117. Id. at 851 (“Washington has a remarkably one-sided view of the Treaties . . . . Opening up 
the Northwest for white settlement was indeed the principle purpose of the United States. But it was 
most certainly not the principal purpose of the Indians. Their principal purpose was to secure a 
means of supporting themselves once the Treaties took effect.”). Construing treaties as the tribes 
would understand is one of the canons of treaty interpretation. See supra note 35.  
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)). On the Winans decision, 
see Winans Centennial, supra note 3. 
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treaties in “such a cynical and disingenuous” fashion would be wholly 
inconsistent with Governor Stevens’ assurances that the treaties would 
supply them “food and drink . . . forever.”119 
Even had Stevens not expressly promised the tribes that salmon 
would remain abundant, the rules of treaty interpretation would have led 
the Ninth Circuit to infer such a promise.
120
 The court relied on two 
landmark cases that found implied tribal rights: Winters v. United 
States
121
 and United States v. Adair.
122
 The former applied reserved 
rights to water, because a tribal land reservation’s purpose—to make the 
tribes “pastoral and civilized”123—could not be achieved without an 
implied right of water for irrigation.
124
 The latter inferred a water right 
for the Klamath Tribe’s reservation to sustain treaty-reserved hunting 
and fishing rights in Klamath Marsh.
125
 Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
decision affirming Judge Boldt, the Ninth Circuit stated that “even in the 
absence of explicit promise, we would infer a promise that the number 
of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate living’ to the 
Tribes.”126 
The court also used the rules of treaty interpretation to reject the 
state’s allegation that the federal government’s actions and inactions 
over the years led the state to believe the government had waived its 
                                                     
119. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s use of the canons of treaty interpretation was fully consistent with 
recent Supreme Court case law like Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 
172 (1999) (using the canons to construe an 1837 treaty ceding lands to the federal government but 
retaining the right to hunt, fish, and gather to survive a subsequent treaty, executive order, and 
statute), where all nine members of the Court endorsed the canons; see id. at 196, 200 (majority); id. 
at 218 (dissent) (“[U]sing our canons of construction that ambiguities in treaties are often resolved 
in favor of the Indians . . . .”); United States v. Brown, 777 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2015) (using 
the canons to interpret the same 1837 treaty to bar federal prosecution of tribal members fishing on-
reservation in violation of a tribal code).  
120. Washington, 827 F.3d at 852 (“Even if Governor Stevens had not explicitly promised that 
‘this paper secures your fish,’ and that there would be food ‘forever,’ we would infer such a 
promise.”).  
121. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (concluding that the federal government 
implicitly reserved water rights for an Indian irrigation project when it set aside land for the Fort 
Belknap reservation). 
122. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (implying “time immemorial” water 
rights to fulfill the Klamath Reservation’s fishing and hunting purposes) (authored by the late judge, 
Betty Fletcher, William Fletcher’s mother). 
123. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. 
124. Washington, 827 F.3d at 852. 
125. See id.  
126. Id. at 852–53 (citing Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 
686 (1979), to the effect that “[s]almon now available for harvest are not sufficient to provide a ‘moderate 
living’ to the Tribes.”). On the Supreme Court’s moderate living language, see supra note 74. 
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right to enforce the treaties. The state cited a number of federal actions 
and inactions implementing the Endangered Species and Clean Water 
Acts and federal funding of highways with culverts designed according 
to federal standards.
127
 But the court ruled that such a treaty abrogation 
required “an Act of Congress that ‘clearly express[es an] intent to do 
so.”128 And not only was there no statute terminating rights reserved by 
the Stevens Treaties, the federal government, as trustee, joined the tribes 
in asserting those rights in the case.
129
 
The state’s effort to invoke the Supreme Court’s City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation
130
 as support for its claim that the equitable 
doctrines of laches or estoppel prevented the federal government from 
asserting the treaty right also proved unavailing. Judge Fletcher 
distinguished Sherrill on the ground that the Oneida tribe had abandoned 
its land and let its aboriginal rights claim fall dormant; the Stevens’ 
Treaty tribes had done neither—in fact, they had been contesting in court 
state actions affecting their fishing rights for over a century.
131
 
Moreover, the court reaffirmed its rule that neither laches, nor estoppel, 
nor waiver may defeat Indian treaty rights.
132
 
The state also failed to convince the court that the federal government 
had an obligation to fix its own road culverts before suing the state. The 
state argued that the district court’s injunction requiring it to fix 
offending barrier culverts was unfair and imposed a disproportionate 
burden on the state.
133
 But the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on 
both sovereign immunity and standing grounds. On the former, the court 
ruled that sovereign immunity protected the federal government from 
affirmative relief in the absence of its consent.
134
 On the latter, in the 
                                                     
127. See Washington, 827 F.3d at 854. 
128. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999)).  
129. Id. (“The United States, as trustee for the Tribes, may bring suit on their behalf to enforce 
the Tribes’ rights, but the rights belong to the Tribes.”). 
130. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (ruling that 
tribal purchase of land with aboriginal rights did not revive the tribal sovereignty over the land 
because of a roughly 200-year period of time in which the tribe allegedly had not sought to regain 
title). 
131. Washington, 827 F.3d at 855 (“The Tribes have not abandoned their 
reservations . . . . Washington and the Tribes have been in a more or less continuous state of conflict 
over treaty-based fishing fights for over one hundred years.”).  
132. Id. at 854 (citing Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 234 (1923)); United States v. 
Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 649 (9th Cir. 1998). Concerning the waiver claim, the court decided that 
“[b]ecause the treaty rights belong to the Tribes rather than the United States, it is not the 
prerogative of the United States to waive them.” Washington, 827 F.3d at 854. 
133. See Washington, 827 F.3d at 855. 
134. Id. 
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process of rejecting the state’s standing, the court clarified that the 
federal government’s culverts did in fact violate the treaties, no less than 
the state’s culverts did.135 The court concluded, however, that the state 
lacked standing to enforce the treaty right of the tribes which, Judge 
Fletcher noted, had “not sought redress against the United States in the 
proceeding now before us.”136 
If there were no right to protect the environment necessary to preserve 
fish habitat, the Ninth Circuit thought that the state could impermissibly 
“crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places 
to fish,” something the Supreme Court had proscribed.137 In effect, the 
tribes’ “in common” treaty right was a tribal property right that protected 




B.  Affirming the Martinez Injunction 
The state’s best chance to change the Martinez Decision was probably 
to challenge the scope of the injunction the court ordered: (1) requiring 
the state to fix barrier culverts that it had already committed to fix; (2) 
prescribing a seventeen-year period for fixing the majority of barrier 
culverts; but (3) also providing an exemption for ten percent of the 
priority culverts; and (4) not requiring the state to fix non-priority 
culverts until the end of their life, or when there was a new roadway 
project.
139
 But because the state thought the injunction was unjustified, it 
                                                     
135. Id. at 856 (“Our holding that Washington has violated the Treaties in building and 
maintaining its barrier culverts violated the Treaties necessarily means that the United States has 
also violated the Treaties in building and maintaining its own barrier culverts.”). 
136. Id.  
137. Id. at 852 (emphasis in original) (quoting Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676–77 (1979)) (“Governor Stevens and his associates were well aware 
of the ‘sense’ in which the Indians were likely to view assurances regarding their fishing rights. 
During the negotiations, the vital importance of the fish to the Indians was repeatedly emphasized 
by both sides, and the Governor’s promises that the treaties would protect that source of food and 
commerce were crucial in obtaining the Indians’ assent. It is absolutely clear, as Governor Stevens 
himself said, that neither he nor the Indians intended that the latter should be excluded from their 
ancient fisheries, and it is accordingly inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to 
authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places 
to fish.”) (emphasis in original). 
138. Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 676. The proscription against 
“crowding out” the tribes from the fishery was an antimonopolistic sentiment typical of nineteenth 
century public land policies. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in 
American Public Land Law, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 159–84 (2016) (tracing antimonopoly 
policies in the nineteenth century). 
139. See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
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refused to participate in negotiating its terms.
140
 This strategy turned out 
to be a colossal mistake, as neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit 




After reviewing the evidence before the lower court,
142
 the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the state’s claims that there was no evidence in the 
record that state-owned culverts had a significant effect on salmon 
production, citing the state’s own studies contradicting this allegation.143 
In fact, the court concluded that the state studies had underestimated the 
effect of fixing deficient barrier culverts, finding a habitat capability of 
producing “several times the 200,000 mature salmon” specified in a 
1997 state report that referred to barrier culverts as “one of the most 
recurrent and correctible obstacles” to restoring healthy salmon runs.144 
The court also relied heavily on tribal experts—as well as the state’s—
concerning the importance of fixing culverts that block salmon 
migration, and thus rejected the state’s claim that the lower court had no 
evidence to support its injunction.
145
 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the state’s contention concerning the 
overbreadth of the district court’s injunction. The court took particular 
issue with the state’s claim that the injunction “indiscriminately orders 
correction of . . . every . . . barrier culvert” in the case area, because the 
district court’s order in fact had “carefully distinguishe[d] between high- 
and low-priority culverts based on the amount of upstream habitat 
culvert correction will open up.”146 The lower court also authorized an 
exemption for up to ten percent of high-priority culverts to be fixed on 
the “more lenient” schedule for low-priority culverts.147 
In addition, the court rejected the state’s estimates of the cost of 
implementing the injunction, finding them to be “not supported by the 
evidence” and citing studies showing the state-claimed costs to be 
                                                     
140. Washington, 827 F.3d at 858.  See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
141. On the district court’s injunction, see supra notes 103–13 and accompanying text. 
142. Washington, 827 F.3d at 856 (providing an extensive explanation of the district court’s 
injunction). 
143. Id. at 858–59. 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 859–60 (citing testimony of tribal experts, Mike McHenry and Lawrence Wasserman, 
and a state expert, Paul Wagner). See also id. at 860 (describing the significant adverse effects on 
salmon migration of barrier culverts). 
146. Id. at 860. 
147. Id. 
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 Nor did the state account for the fact that 
federal funding would cover a considerable amount of the cost of 
correcting offending barrier culverts.
149
 Thus, the state’s allegation that 
the injunction would cost “roughly $100 million per year” and result in 
“deep and painful cuts to subsidized health insurance for low income 
workers, K-12 schools, higher education, and basic aid for persons 
unable to work” was, the court thought, “dramatically overstated.”150 
The court observed that the state had a separate transportation budget of 
$9.9 billion during the 2011–13 biennium,151 meaning that “money will 
not be taken from education, social services, or other vital State 
programs to fund culvert repairs.”152 
Finally, the court rejected the state’s argument that the district court’s 
injunction violated several of what the state called “federalism 
principles.”153 The Ninth Circuit thought the Martinez Injunction 
violated no federalism principles, quoting the Supreme Court’s 
affirmance of Judge Boldt’s regulation of the salmon fishery in the wake 
of state intransigence in the 1970s, in which the Court stated that it was 
“absurd to argue . . . both that the state agencies may not be ordered to 
implement the [court] decree and also that the District Court may not 
itself issue detailed remedial orders as a substitute for state 




                                                     
148. See id. at 862 (suggesting that the cost estimate of $2.3 million per culvert was an 
overestimate by roughly 30% to 70%) (citing an average of $658,639 per culvert corrected prior to 
the 2009 trial and $1,827,168 for twenty-four culverts fixed thereafter, although the state had no 
cost figures on eight other culverts). The court also noted that state’s cost estimates did not include 
the exemption for up to 10% of high-priority culverts and failed to factor in the marginal costs of 
complying with the court’s accelerated schedule of culvert repair already required by federal and 
state law. Id. 
149. Id. (citing the district court’s finding that the federal government would fund $22 million 
during the years 2011–17 and $15.8 million in the 2013–15 biennium). 
150. Id. at 863 (quoting from the state’s brief).  
151. Id. at 863–64. 
152. Id. at 864 (quoting the district court’s decision).  Even using the state’s inflated cost figures, 
$100 million annually for culvert repairs would amount to roughly just two percent of the state’s 
$9.9 billion transportation budget during the 2013–15 biennium.  
153. Id. at 864 (claiming that an injunction should: (1) be no broader than necessary to cure a 
federal law violation; (2) grant deference to a state’s institutional competency and subject matter 
expertise; (3) not substitute a court’s budgetary judgment for that of the state’s; and (4) be the least 
intrusive relief in terms of interfering with a state’s governmental affairs). 
154. Id. (quoting Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 
(1979)) (emphasis omitted). 
155. The Ninth Circuit did suggest that the district court should “should not hesitate” to modify 
the injunction should new facts or circumstances warrant. Id. at 865. The state appealed the panel 
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VI. BEYOND THE MARTINEZ DECISION: THE TREATY 
FISHING RIGHT’S EFFECT ON OTHER HABITAT-
DAMAGING ACTIVITIES 
In terms of the potential implications of the Ninth Circuit’s 
affirmation of the Martinez Injunction, perhaps the easiest extrapolation 
concerns other road culverts. In response to the state’s argument that the 
lower court’s injunction was unfair because it required the state to fix its 
faulty culverts before the federal government had to do so, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court on both sovereign-immunity and 
standing grounds.
156
 Although the court specifically found that the 
federal government had also violated the treaty fishing right with its 
culverts,
157
 it rejected the state’s claim because “any violation of the 
Treaties by the United States violates rights held by the Tribes” and they 
                                                     
decision, seeking a rehearing or a rehearing en banc, claiming that the panel adopt a rule rejected by 
the en banc Ninth Circuit in 1985, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, forcing 
“Washingtonians to spend billions to correct the federal government’s mistakes,” and requiring 
future land and water management changes. State of Washington’s Petition for 
Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc at 1, United States v. Washington, No. CV 70-9213 (Aug. 11, 2016). 
The state maintained that the panel decision gave “the district court unprecedented power to make 
policy in Washington,” fixing a problem caused by the federal government, which had approved the 
design of virtually all the culverts at issue. Id. at 3–4. The state also alleged that the effect of the 
panel decision’s recognition of a habitat protection right was to impermissibly guarantee to the 
tribes a minimum quantity of fish. Id. at 9. Although the state conceded in its briefing to the panel 
that “the treaties protect against habitat protection that discriminates against tribal fishing,” it 
claimed that the injunction affirmed by the panel was overbroad, imprecise, uncertain, and 
inconsistent with the 1985 en banc decision, requesting a rehearing “to articulate the treaty 
obligation most precisely than the panel did.” Id. at 10. The state suggested that a more appropriate 
and workable injunction would target only those culverts that “prevent meaningful use of a usual 
and accustomed tribal fishing ground that would be otherwise useable,” because the injunction the 
panel upheld “requires the State to replace culverts even when doing so will make no difference,” as 
“roughly 90% of state barrier culverts are upstream or downstream of other barriers.” Id. at 11, 15–
16. In addition, the state attempted to resurrect the 1982 panel decision’s litmus of “reasonable steps 
commensurate with” the state’s resources, id. at 11, but that standard was vacated by the 1985 en 
banc panel, see supra note 86. Finally, the state contended that panel erroneously rejected its 
argument that it should be able to recoup some of the costs of replacing culverts from the federal 
government for culverts that it designed, funded or authorized. Id. at 12–13.  
Idaho and Montana submitted an amicus brief supporting Washington’s rehearing petition, 
alleging that the panel decision was inconsistent with the case law implying rights in Indian treaties 
where “absolutely necessary” or where the purposes of a reservation would be “defeated,” neither of 
which obtained in the culverts case. States of Idaho and Montana’s Brief Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, United States v. Washington, No. 
CV 70-9213 (Aug. 22, 2016). The states also objected to the panel’s dismissal of equitable 
principles like “reasonable expectations, belated assertion of rights, and the practical effect of the 
requested claim relief.” Id. at 4 (citing City of Sherrill v. Oneida Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 
(2005)).  
156. Washington, 827 F.3d at 855. 
157. Id. at 856.  See also supra note 135 (quoting the Ninth Circuit). 
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“have not sought redress against the United States” in the case before 
us.
158
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that the tribes could 
successfully sue the federal government, obtaining similar relief. But 
there would be significant impediments to proceeding against the federal 
government.
159
 Moreover, rather than filing suit, the tribes may wish to 
file a rulemaking petition with federal agencies requesting a schedule for 
fixing the federal culverts, mostly on national forests, in order to 




On the other hand, culverts built and maintained by local 
governments do not seem to be expressly subject to the district court’s 
injunction.
161
 Thus, that loophole could prompt a separate suit by the 
tribes, although there is a strong argument that local governments—as 
mere “creatures” of the state—are subject to the state’s obligations.162 
                                                     
158. Washington, 827 F.3d at 856.   
159. Whether the tribes could successfully sue the federal government for injunctive relief 
concerning its barrier culverts is not entirely clear. A breach of trust suit is possible, see Mary C. 
Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims of 
Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355 (2003), but such a suit would 
succeed only if the federal government violated specific statutory or regulatory duties. COHEN 
TREATISE, supra note 35, § 5.05[3][c]. Money damages would be unlikely. Although the Indian 
Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for money damages against the federal government, there is 
a six-year statute of limitations period, and the Supreme Court has interpreted the liability standard 
quite narrowly. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (reversing a decision 
awarding the tribe money damages under other statutes because they did not establish a specific 
fiduciary duty that could be interpreted as requiring compensation for damages due to a breach of 
duty imposed by the governing law); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (no 
statutory or regulatory basis for an award of money damages under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act 
for the Secretary of Interior’s approval of a coal lease with a royalty rate of eight percent below 
what had been negotiated). 
160. Presumably, the federal agency would conduct an analysis under the National 
Environmental Policy Act to decide how best to proceed. 
161. See Washington, 827 F.3d at 857–58 (describing the lower court’s injunction); Martinez 
Injunction, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391, at *24–25 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2013) (approving 
the injunction requested by the tribes and the federal government). In Skokomish Indian Tribe v. 
United States, 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005), the court denied a tribe’s claim that the City of 
Tacoma’s federally licensed Cushman dam interfered with its treaty fishing rights because its treaty 
did not support an implied right of action for damages by a third party, a result that engendered 
withering criticism from a respected commentator. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Regrets 
and the Case of the Cushman Dam, 35 ENVTL. L. 397 (2005). On the other hand, a federal licensee 
who flooded reservation land was liable in trespass. United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. 
No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally COHEN TREATISE, supra note 35, § 18.04[g][3]. 
162. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 362 (2009) (explaining that local 
governments are not sovereign entities, but rather are “subordinate governmental instrumentalities 
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions”) (quoting Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476 
(1982) (“States traditionally have been accorded the widest latitude in ordering their internal 
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Moreover, state law quite clearly requires fishways in streams to prevent 
obstructions like barrier culverts.
163
 A judicial injunction could make the 
state enforce that promise against city-owned and county-owned 
culverts. 
Culverts in other states within the Ninth Circuit, like California, 
Idaho, and Oregon, also seem vulnerable to the tribes’ use of the 
affirmation of the Martinez Injunction.
164
 For example, the Ninth Circuit 
could have mentioned the Oregon Statehood Act’s promise of free-
flowing navigable waters.
165
 Oregon therefore may be in violation of 
both the Stevens Treaties and its own statehood statute. Tribal suits 
against the other states, if the federal government joined,
166
 could 
prompt those states to prepare plans identifying barrier culverts and 
prioritize them consistent with the Martinez Injunction. 
In addition to barrier culverts, dams also impede salmon migration. 
Many dams provide fish passage but hardly any are operated to 
maximize salmon survival. Some dams—like the federal dams on the 
lower Snake River—destroy salmon habitat and hamper migration while 
providing minimal public benefits compared with their public costs.
167
 
                                                     
governmental processes . . . and school boards, as creatures of the State, obviously must give effect 
to policies announced by the state legislature.”) (internal citations omitted). 
163. See Martinez Injunction, 2013 WL 1334381, at *6 (“Washington State law has long required 
that obstructions across or in its streams be provided with a durable and efficient fishway, 
maintained in an effective condition and continuously supplied with sufficient water to freely pass 
fish.”). 
164. Idaho would be affected by at least the Treaty with the Nez Perce, a Stevens Treaty tribe. 
Treaty with the Nez Perces, 1855, Jun. 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (ratified 1859). Oregon has other 
Stevens Treaty tribes, like the Walla Walla, Cayuse, and the Umatilla tribes. Treaty with the 
WallaWalla, Cayuse, Etc., June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945 (ratified 1859). And both Oregon and 
California would have obligations to the Klamath Tribes, whose 1864 treaty was not a Stevens 
Treaty, but it did expressly recognize the tribes’ fishing, hunting, and gathering rights, albeit only on 
reservation. Treaty with the Klamath, Etc., Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707 (ratified 1866) (interpreted to 
include water rights to fulfill the fishing and hunting purposes of the 1864 treaty in United States v. 
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
165. See Oregon Statehood Act, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859) (navigable waters to be “common 
highways and forever free”). 
166. Without the federal government joining the suit, the states would enjoy protection from suit 
due to sovereign immunity. For example, in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), the 
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit against the state concerning the ownership of 
Lake Coeur d’Alene. But when the federal government subsequently joined the suit, the tribe 
prevailed, since the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits by the federal government. Idaho 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).  
167. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-CV-00640-SI, 2016 WL 
2353647, at *8 (D. Or. May 4, 2016) (requiring an environmental impact statement to analyze, 
among other things, the breaching of the four federal lower Snake River dams); Michael C. Blumm, 
et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic, and Legal 
Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and Restoring 
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The tribes may choose not to invoke their treaty rights against federal 
dams, for the reasons stated above.
168
 But there are many non-federal 
dams obstructing fish passage and damaging fish habitat, the operation 
of which could violate treaty fishing rights.
169
 
Diversions that dewater streams can have much the same effects on 
fish migration as barrier culverts or dams. The dewatering of a tribe’s 
usual and accustomed fishing ground would seem to be no less a treaty 
right violation as migration blockage by a structure in the stream. The 
Nez Perce Tribe asserted its Stevens Treaty fishing rights in the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication,
170
 but a state trial court rejected any 
application of the tribe’s rights off-reservation, a result patently 
inconsistent with applicable case law.
171
 The tribe subsequently agreed 
to a settlement of its claims with the state,
172
 so the lower court decision 
was not appealed. But the issue of dewatering off-reservation treaty 
usual and accustomed fishing grounds remains a live one. 
Less obvious problems for salmon concern water diversions that 
increase water temperatures and can lead to violations of water quality 
standards.
173
 The effect of diversions on salmon is likely to be 
exacerbated by warming temperatures and changes in precipitation 
                                                     
Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997 (1998) (maintaining that the costs of the federal dams on the 
Lower Snake River are dramatically higher than their benefits). 
168. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
169. According to the Congressional Research Service, there are some 300 non-federal 
hydroelectric dams in the states of Idaho (135), Oregon (79), and Washington (86), far more than 
the 22 federal dams in the three Northwest states. KELSI BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., HYDROPOWER: FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL INVESTMENT 4–5 (July 7, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42579.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP8Q-NFWR]. 
170. See Ann Y. Vonde et al., Understanding the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 52 IDAHO L. 
REV. 53, 111, 151 (2016) (an exhaustive article by current or former Idaho Deputy Attorneys 
General that represented the state in the long-running SRBA). 
171. In re Snake River Basin Adjudication, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 (Idaho Dist. Ct.  
Nov. 10, 1999), criticized in Michael C. Blumm, Dale D. Goble, Judith V. Royster & Mary 
Christina Wood, Judicial Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake River Case, 36 IDAHO L. 
REV. 449, 451–52 (2000) (maintaining that the court misunderstood the purpose of the treaty, 
misconstrued or ignored relevant Supreme Court cases, and erroneously concluded that the tribe’s 
reasoned water rights were limited to reservation lands). 
172. See Vonde, supra note 170, at 170–73; Mediation of the Stake River Basin Adjudication, 42 
IDAHO L. REV. 547, 547–793 (2006). 
173. See generally Richard M. Adams & Dannele E. Peck, Effects of Climate Change on Drought 
Frequency: Potential Impacts and Mitigation Opportunities, in MANAGING WATER RESOURCES IN 
A TIME OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: MOUNTAINS, VALLEYS AND FLOOD PLAINS 126 (Alberti 
Garrido & Ariel Dinar eds., 2009); Craig Johnston, Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking 
Endangered Species Seriously in Establishing Water Quality Standards, 33 ENVTL. L. 151 (2003); 
Kelly House, A Creek in Crisis: Oregon Pours Millions into Saving Steelhead but Lacks a Crucial 
Element: Water, OREGONIAN, Sept. 2, 2016, at A1.  
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patterns due to climate change.
174
 Similarly, timber harvests, grazing 
practices, and construction projects can produce sedimentation in salmon 
streams in violation of water quality standards.
175
 Although water quality 
standards violations might not be as dramatic an interference with 
salmon migration and habitat as road culverts and dams, they remain 
significant obstacles to salmon restoration.
176
 Moreover, to the extent 
that any federal land usage triggers evaluations required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), it would seem that among the 
reasonable alternatives that a federal agency must consider to comply 
with NEPA would be one protecting treaty fishing rights.
177
 Further, it 
may be that the agency would have no choice but to select the alternative 
that protects the right of taking fish, since administrative agencies have 
no authority to terminate or curtail treaty rights.
178
 
Because any of the above-described actions may be subject to treaty-
imposed limits does not necessarily mean that all culverts, dams, 
diversions, and land-use practices will be subject to treaty constraints.
179
 
Applying treaty rights to particular activities will be a factual decision 
that, under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, will first consider whether 
there is an affirmative action adversely affecting fish subject to the 
                                                     
174. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, Mem. Op. & J. (E.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 1979)  
(establishing tribal reserved water rights in part based on salmon habitat needs) (discussed in Robert 
T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian County, 34 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 195, 219–23 (2015)). 
175. See, e.g., James W. Burns, Spawning Bed Sedimentation Studies in Northern California 
Streams, 56 CAL. DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME 253 (1970); David Wann, Timber and Tourists: Idaho 
Confronts Logging Issues, 13 EPA J. 20, 20 (1987); Mary Ann Madej, How Suspended Organic 
Sediment Affects Turbidity and Fish Feeding Behavior, SOUND WAVES MONTHLY NEWSLETTER: 
COSTAL AND MARINE RESEARCH NEWS FROM ACROSS THE USGS (Nov. 2004), 
http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2004/11/research2.html [https://perma.cc/M32P-BP9P]. 
176. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 222–32; ALBERT H. MIRATI, JR., OR. DEP’T OF 
FISH AND WILDLIFE, ASSESSMENT OF ROAD CULVERTS FOR FISH PASSAGE PROBLEMS ON STATE- 
AND COUNTY-OWNED ROADS (1999); David M. Price, Timothy Quinn & Robert J. Barnard, Fish 
Passage Effectiveness of Recently Constructed Road Crossing Culverts in the Puget Sound Region 
of Washington State, 30 N. AM. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 1110 (2010), http://wdfw.wa.gov/ 
publications/01339/wdfw01339.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGD5-PSTR]. 
177. The Council on Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations require federal agencies to 
“rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives” to proposed actions. 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1978). 
178. See infra note 209. The effect of the treaty right to habitat protection might transform the 
NEPA process into one seeking the most protective of treaty fishing right, a kind of substantive 
NEPA long sought by environmentalists. See, e.g., Jamison E. Colburn, The Risk in Discretion: 
Substantive NEPA’s Significance, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2016). 
179. However, it is clear that the treaty right burdens not only governmental actions but also 
private property. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Winans decision). 
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 Second, the action must proximately cause significant 
damage;
181
 de minimis harms do not apparently violate the treaties.
182
 
These fact-based considerations will invite trial courts to make case-by-
case decisions.
183
 They closely resemble the language used by Judge 
Orrick without the express burden shifting he prescribed.
184
 In 
application, there might not be much of a difference from the Orrick 
                                                     
180. See United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The facts presented in 
the district court establish that Washington has acted affirmatively to build and maintain barrier 
culverts under its roads.”).  
181. See id. (determining that: (1) the tribes’ “moderate living” needs were not being met; and (2) 
the state’s barrier culverts in the case area “block approximately 1,000 linear miles of streams 
suitable for salmon habitat, comprising almost 5 million square meters,” concluding that fixing the 
barrier culverts would restore access to “several hundred thousand additional mature salmon” to 
pass them each year (citing Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658, 686 (1979))). On the largely overlooked role of proximate cause in environmental law, see 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or. v. Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 (1995) 
(explaining that in order for there to be an unlawful “take” under the Endangered Species Act, the 
action must be the proximate cause of death or injury to animals protected by the Act). Concerning 
the “notoriously malleable” proximate cause standard, see James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, 
and Proximate Cause: Lessons From Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife 
Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 606–09 (2003) 
(discussing the Sweet Home opinions).  
182. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 490–91 (explaining de minimis cases). At oral argument, 
Judge Ezra was particularly worried about not enjoining actions producing only de minimis effects. 
Oral Argument at 28:45, United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 13-
35474), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000008307 (last visited Jan. 
24, 2017). 
183. At oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, the tribes’ attorney suggested that the facts would 
determine whether the treaties were violated by particular activities. Oral Argument at 23:33, 25:58, 
United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 13-35474), http://www.ca9. 
uscourts.gov/media/ view_video.php?pk_vid=0000008307 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). The factual-
based evaluation might resemble case-by-case balancing in which common law courts have long 
engaged in nuisance cases. Nuisance doctrine protects against substantial (non-de minimis) and 
unreasonable interferences with the use and enjoyment of property and community rights. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRIVATE NUISANCE: ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY § 822 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979). However, the defense of “reasonableness,” which nuisance defendants often 
successfully invoke, see infra note 214, would not be available in case-by-case evaluation of actions 
affecting treaty rights, as that was part of the vacated 1982 panel decision which the en banc Ninth 
Circuit rejected in 1985. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc) (vacating the opinion of the panel which first heard the case in 1982); United States v. 
Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he State and the Tribes must each take 
reasonable steps commensurate with their respective resources and abilities to preserve and enhance 
the fishery.”). 
184. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Both Judge Orrick and the Ninth Circuit tied the 
habitat right to the tribes’ moderate living needs. See Orrick Decision, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 
(1980); 1985 Washington, 759 F.2d at 1359. 
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formula announced in 1980.
185
 If so, the tribes will have lost thirty-six 
years of enforcement but not the fundamental right to protect the fish 
that was the tribes’ principal concern in negotiating the treaties of the 
1850s. Although widespread disruption of state and local economies are 
unlikely, all non-tribal entities should now feel prodded to improve 




The rules of interpretation concerning Indian treaties
187
 were crucial 
to the decisions of Judge Martinez and the Ninth Circuit, both of which 
emphasized the Indian understanding of the treaties they signed in the 
1850s.
188
 The resort to such foundational interpretative principles echoed 
some recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
189
 But the promises 
made to the tribes in the Stevens Treaties 160 years ago—the right of 
taking fish in common with the settlers at usual fishing places—were 
express, not implied.
190
 And this express promise had been construed, 
largely favorably to the tribes, numerous times by the Supreme Court 
                                                     
185. Although the en banc Ninth Circuit vacated the Orrick Decision, it did so only on the ground 
of the imprudence of making treaty rights declarations in the absence of concrete facts. 1985 
Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357. 
186. One way to minimize conflicts between damaging developments and treaty rights would be 
to consult with the tribes in advance of considering the merits of such proposals. Under Executive 
Order 13,007, federal agencies must, “to the extent practicable, . . . avoid adversely affecting the 
physical integrity of [tribal] sacred sites.” 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (1996). Presumably, this directive 
requires some sort of consultation with affected tribes. However, it is not entirely clear that treaty 
fishing and other off-reservation usufructuary rights are sacred sites, and the executive order does 
not apply to states or to private actions not requiring federal approval, does not override other law or 
“essential agency functions” and does not create a cause of action. Id. at 26, 771–72. 
187. See supra notes 35, 119–20, 127–29 and accompanying text. 
188. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 851 (9th Cir. 2016); Martinez Decision, No. CV 
9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 at *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007)  
189. See supra note 119 (discussing the Mille Lacs decision); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Cmtys., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014) (employing the canons in upholding tribal 
sovereign immunity); Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 
2159 (2016) (affirming a Fifth Circuit decision, Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 
746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), which upheld tribal court jurisdiction over a dispute between a tribal 
member and a non-member corporation doing business on reservation). 
190. Judge Fletcher would have implied the habitat right; however, see Washington, 827 F.3d at 
852 (“Thus, even if Governor Stevens had made no explicit promise, we would infer, as in Winters 
and Adair, a promise to ‘support the purpose’ of the Treaties. That is, even in the absence of an 
explicit promise, we would infer a promise that the number of fish would always be sufficient to 
provide a ‘moderate living’ to the Tribes.”) (citing Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979)). 
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over the course of the twentieth century.
191
 Both parties to the treaties—
the tribes and their federal trustee—urged the courts, in light of this 
substantial precedent, to construe the treaty language to include habitat 
protection for fish. The State of Washington, which was not in existence 
in the 1850s, not only was not party to the treaty negotiations but had a 




A. The State’s Failed Efforts to Resist the Treaty Right 
The state’s arguments were all met with judicial dubiety. For 
example, the state argued that restoring salmon passage at state-owned 
culverts was not the only or best way to fix the salmon problem.
193
 Even 
if this contention contained an element of truth, the allegation was 
ultimately irrelevant because the issue was whether state-owned and 
operated road culverts significantly damaged the tribes’ fishing rights. 
Moreover, promises of “comprehensive” salmon restoration have, over 
the past three decades, produced very little restoration, at least in terms 
of spawning fish,
194
 despite large-scale public expenditures.
195
 
The state did have a plan to restore fish passage at barrier culverts, but 
fully implementing it would not be achieved, in the district judge’s 




 Identified barrier culverts 
                                                     
191. See Washington, 827 F.3d at 842–48 (retracing the history of the adjudication of the Tribes’ 
treaty rights); see SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 37–45, 60–64; Piscary Profit, supra note 
18, at 440–53, 457–59. 
192. See, e.g., Washington, 827 F.3d at 841–45; SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 63–64, 
74–82; supra notes 27, 67–68 and accompanying text. 
193. Washington, 827 F.3d at 861. 
194. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 129–60, 173–217 (describing the disappointing 
restoration results under the Northwest Power and Endangered Species Acts).  
195. For example, in fiscal year 2015, the Bonneville Power Administration claimed fish and 
wildlife costs of some $757 million on fish and wildlife restoration in the Columbia Basin alone, 
including nearly $200 million in so-called “forgone hydropower revenues.” In total, Bonneville 
claimed to incur $15.3 billion in fish and wildlife costs between 1978 and 2015, not counting $2.66 
billion spent on capital improvements such as fish-passage facilities. NORTHWEST POWER AND 
CONSERVATION COUNCIL, 2015 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM COSTS 
REPORT: 15TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST GOVERNORS 5, 23, 25 (2015). A report for the 
Governor’s Salmon Recovery Office in Washington estimated a cost of $5.5 billion between 2010 
and 2019 for habitat-related elements of salmon recovery within the state. See DENNIS CANTY ET 
AL., FUNDING FOR SALMON RECOVERY IN WASHINGTON STATE 6 (2011), www.rco.wa.gov/ 
documents/gsro/SalmonRecoveryFundingReport2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/68J8-THED].  
196. Martinez Injunction, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 
2013). 
197. Id. at *18. 
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actually increased from 2009 to 2011.
198
 And state assertions about the 
costs of implementing the district court’s injunction met with deep 
judicial skepticism and were ultimately rejected.
199
 
The state’s legal strategy failed as well. Its principal mistake was 
abstaining from negotiations over the scope of the injunction during the 
six years the state denied the validity of the district court’s decision.200 
The upshot was that both Judge Martinez and the Ninth Circuit accepted 
the injunction proffered by the tribes and their trustee,
201
 and the state 
likely forfeited an opportunity to urge more flexible implementation.
202
 
B. The Federal Role in Protecting the Treaty Right 
The federal trustee’s role in the case was remarkable. The trustee 
never wavered as the nearly half-century-old litigation proceeded from 
securing a harvest share, including hatchery fish in that share, and 
implying a right of habitat protection. The federal trustee has not always 
been so steadfast in pursuing the interest of the tribes.
203
 This 
resoluteness was all the more surprising in this case, given the federal 
government’s ownership of road culverts that violated the treaty right as 
much as the state’s.204 The state tried to make something of the federal 
government’s compromised position, arguing that it was unfair to make 
the state fix its culverts while overlooking the federal culverts,
205
 but the 
Ninth Circuit ruled, on sovereign-immunity and standing grounds, that 
the state had no viable claim, since the treaty right was the tribes’ to 
                                                     
198. Id. at *17.  
199. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 862 (9th Cir. 2016); see also supra notes 148–
52 and accompanying text. 
200. Washington, 827 F.3d at 864. 
201. Martinez Injunction, at *25; Washington, 827 F.3d at 865. 
202. The Ninth Circuit was critical of the state’s unwillingness to participate in negotiating the 
scope of the injunction. Id. at 858. On the other hand, given the district court’s findings about the 
state’s schedule for fixing faulty culverts—described as both “taking a hundred years” and never 
finishing, see supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text—perhaps the state was not in a strong 
negotiating position. 
203. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (holding that there was no 
trust violation in the Secretary of Interior’s secret meetings with coal companies leasing Indian 
lands for arguably below-market royalties); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (ruling 8-3 that the Forest Service did not violate its trust obligation by 
approving the use of treated sewage water to make snow promoting winter skiing on sacred sites of 
several tribes). For a recent assessment of the obligations of the federal trustee, see Anderson, supra 
note 89, at 476–85.  
204. Washington, 827 F.3d at 856; see also supra notes 135, 157 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
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 The tribes may decide to proceed against the federal 
government in the future but, as suggested above,
207
 they may choose to 
not to do so if the federal government applies this legal standard to all of 
its activities as a matter of course. 
But the federal role in adversely affecting salmon migration and 
habitat is considerable, particularly in the Columbia Basin, where federal 
dams predominate. A recent district court decision found, for the fourth 
time, that the federal plan of annual hydroelectric operations violated the 
Endangered Species Act.
208
 Quite possibly, the operation of these dams 
also violates treaty fishing rights. In retrospect, it now seems quite 
apparent that the approval of federal dams that blocked salmon 




C. The Road Ahead 
Less clear treaty right violations concern federal land management 
decisions like timber sales and grazing permits that produce 
sedimentation, temperature increases, and loss of riparian habitat that 
damage fish runs, as the significance of the damage may be subject to 
                                                     
206. Washington, 827 F.3d at 855; see also supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in filing suit against the 
federal government). There is some case law suggesting that the tribes might have a viable claim for 
injunctive relief against the federal government. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy 
Corp., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) (requiring the federal government to adopt not merely a 
reasonable interpretation of oil and gas royalties but a reasonable interpretation benefiting the tribe); 
Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (requiring 
the federal government to intervene in land claims litigation). These and other injunctive relief cases 
are discussed in RESTATEMENT OF INDIAN LAW § 10 cmt. c at 165–68 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
208. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2016 WL 2353647 (D. Or. May 4, 
2016). See also Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA 
Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 87 (2013); Michael C. Blumm, Julianne L. Fry & Olivier Jamin, Still Crying Out For a 
“Major Overhaul” After All These Years–Salmon and the Fourth Failed Biological Opinion on 
Columbia Basin Hydroelectric Operations, 47 ENVTL L. (forthcoming 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858098. Unlike the ESA, treaty rights do not impose an affirmative 
obligation to restore salmon runs. They do, however, restrict state actions—like the building and 
maintenance of road culverts—which damage fish runs and affect their right to a moderate living 
from fishing. See generally United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016). 
209. The Ninth Circuit ruled that neither the states nor administrative agencies may abrogate 
treaty fishing rights, and that Congress may do so only in clear legislation. Washington, 827 F.3d at 
854 (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999) (ruling 
that the tribe’s rights survived a number of legislative and executive actions)). The Supreme Court 
has ruled treaty abrogation requires Congress to actually consider the issue and clearly resolve the 
issue in favor of abrogation. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (deciding that the Bald 
Eagle Protection Act terminated treaty hunting rights). 
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dispute. But federal land managers will no doubt hear from tribes that 
monitor and comment on federal actions that affect their treaty fishing. 
There is some evidence that the managers—even state agencies—are 
listening. 
In 2015, the Oregon agency with regulatory authority over state lands 
denied a permit for a marina that would have hosted a large coal 
transport facility on the Columbia River, citing treaty fishing 
concerns.
210
 And in 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied a 
permit for the largest coal port in North American on grounds of 
interfering with the Lummi Tribe’s treaty rights.211 These decisions 
could auger poorly for several proposed oil port terminals with treaty 
rights’ effects.212 The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming Judge 
Martinez’s injunction vindicates those decisions by making clear that 
regulatory agencies cannot approve developments that block access to 
treaty fishing sites or diminish the availability of harvestable fish.
213
 The 
prospects of projects that would significantly and adversely affect treaty 
                                                     
210. In August 2014, the state of Oregon rejected a permit from Ambre Energy, an Australian 
company that sought to construct the Coyote Island Terminal on the Columbia River to export 8.8 
million tons of coal annually to Asia. Although environmental groups opposed the terminal on 
grounds that it would unwisely expand the use of coal and accompanying greenhouse gas emissions, 
the state based its denial largely on the disruption the terminal would cause to tribal fisheries. Then 
Governor John Kitzhaber stated, “Columbia River tribes have fundamental rights to these fisheries,” 
and “any project that threatens those rights should be held to high standards.” See Timothy Cama, 
Oregon Blocks Major Coal Export Terminal, HILL (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:54 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/215463-oregon-blocks-major-coal-export-terminal 
[https://perma.cc/F87H-HVXT]. 
211. In May 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers rejected a permit for the largest coal port 
ever proposed in North America, at Cherry Point, Washington, north of the Lummi Tribe’s coastal 
reservation. The Corps did so on the ground that the project, which could have involved nearly 500 
ships per year serving Asian markets, would interfere with tribal treaty fishing rights, particularly 
crab and herring fisheries. The Lummi Tribe opposed the project not only due to vessel traffic and 
pollution risks but also to its adverse effects on one of the tribe’s oldest and largest villages and a 
burial site. See, e.g., Lynda V. Mapes, Tribes Prevail, Kill Proposed Coal Terminal at Cherry Point, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 9, 2016, 1:10 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/ 
tribes-prevail-kill-proposed-coal-terminal-at-cherry-point/ [https://perma.cc/769T-Z2JT]. The 
Corps’ reasoning in rejecting the permit makes for surprisingly good reading. See Memorandum 
from Michelle Walker, Chief, Regulatory Branch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (May 9, 2016), 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/160509mfruademinimisdetermination.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6XB3-HGXL]. 
212. See Ralph Schwartz, Northwest Tribes Band Together to Stop Oil-by-Rail, YES MAGAZINE 
(July 14, 2016), http://www.yesmagazine.org/planet/northwest-tribes-band-together-to-stop-oil-by-
rail-20160712 [https://perma.cc/ZY4F-W9RK] (noting that the Cherry Point Terminal would have 
imposed a direct interference with the Lummi’s fishing practices; other projects with a less direct 
effect on treaty fishing might fare differently) (quoting Robert Anderson, law professor at the 
University of Washington).  
213. See Piscary Profit, supra note 18, at 467–70 (discussing lower courts’ interpretations of the 
effect of treaty fishing rights on the siting of pipelines, sea farms, and residential developments). 
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fishing rights is especially questionable given the fact that resource 
developers cannot defend on the basis of the reasonableness of their 
proposals, claiming that the social utility of their actions outweighs the 
gravity of the harm inflicted.
214
 A reasonableness defense was once 
articulated by a Ninth Circuit panel but later vacated,
215
 and the 2016 
decision did not revive it. The result justifies the tribes’ and their federal 
trustee’s long and winding litigation road, begun nearly a half-century 
ago. 
In a larger sense, however, the culverts case may not signal that all 
tribes may use their treaties to block developments of which they 
oppose. For one thing, not all treaties include off-reservation property 
rights. For another, the federal trustee may not support the tribes—and 
may, in fact, be permitting the development.
216
 These complications may 
distinguish the culverts decision and limit its precedential reach. But the 
significance of the case for salmon restoration not only in the case area 
of the Puget Sound basin but throughout the Pacific Northwest should 
not be underestimated.
217
 It is not an overstatement to suggest that the 
decision is the Stevens Treaty tribes’ most significant victory since the 
Supreme Court’s affirmation of Judge Boldt in 1979.218 
 
                                                     
214. The utility of the conduct versus the gravity of the harm is the classic articulation of a 
reasonable use in the nuisance balancing formula. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: 
GRAVITY OF HARM—FACTORS INVOLVED §§ 827–28 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
215. See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text. 
216. See, e.g., supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
217. See, e.g., supra notes 90, 144, 157–78 and accompanying text. Beyond the facts of the case, 
the decision may signal greater judicial reliance on fundamental principles of Indian law. See supra 
notes 35, 119 and accompanying text; Winans Centennial, supra note 3, at 536–44 (explaining the 
concept of “reserved rights”). 
218. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
